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SEPARATION OF POWERS IN POST-
COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT:
A CONSTITUTIONAL CASE STUDY
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Amy J. Weisman*
INTRODUCTION
This comment explores the myriad of issues related to constructing
and maintaining a stable, democratic, and constitutionally based govern-
ment in the newly independent Russian Federation. Russia recently
adopted a constitution that expresses a dedication to the separation of
powers doctrine.' Although this constitution represents a significant step
forward in the transition from command economy and one-party rule to
market economy and democratic rule, serious violations of the accepted
separation of powers doctrine exist. A thorough evaluation of these
violations, and indeed, the entire governmental structure of the Russian
Federation is necessary to assess its chances for a successful and peace-
ful transition and to suggest alternative means for achieving this goal.
This comment analyzes these constitutional provisions and suggests
solutions to possible problems. Part I discusses the concept of separation
of powers generally. Part II provides a summary of the history and
cultural background of Russia and sets out the context in which to view
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have provided me with support and inspiration in my every endeavor. I also wish to
thank the American Bar Association, Central and East European Law Initiative, Divi-
sion of Legal Assessments for their help and support.
1. See KONsT. RFR [Constitution] art. 10 (Russia) (providing that "State power
in the Russian Federation shall be exercised on the basis of its separation into legisla-
tive, executive and judicial branches. The bodies of legislative, executive and judicial
power shall be independent from one another").
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the new Constitution. Part Ill analyzes the constitutional provisions for
each branch of government in the context of the present political situa-
tion. Finally, Part IV provides predictions for future success and sugges-
tions for possible amendments.
I. SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE
The separation of powers doctrine provides that distribution of powers
within the government should be separated into different branches.2
Although no specific references to this concept exist in the United States
Constitution, the drafters deliberately structured the American system of
government to separate its powers into three distinct divisions:3 a legis-
lative branch to pass laws;4 an executive branch to enforce the laws;5
and a judicial branch to interpret the laws.' The framers of the United
States Constitution insisted on the separation because they regarded the
accumulation of these powers in one person or governmental body as
"the very definition of tyranny."7 The drafters feared that enabling one
branch or person to gain control of the passing, promulgation, and inter-
pretation of the nation's laws would lead to abuse and oppression
Indeed, human nature itself would create such a result if allowed to pro-
ceed without restraint.9
2. GARY WASSERMAN, THE BASICS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 28-29 (4th ed.
1985).
3. Id. at 29.
4. U.S. CONST. art. I. "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives." Id. § 1.
5. Id. art. II. "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America." Id. § 1.
6. Id. art. III. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish." Id. § 1.
7. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison), reprinted in CLASSIC READINGS IN
AMERICAN POLITICS at 43-44 (Pietro S. Nivola & David H. Rosenbloom eds., 1986).
8. Id. at 45.
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), reprinted in CLASSIC READINGS IN
AMERICAN POLITICS, supra note 7, at 49. James Madison writes:
But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human na-
ture? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to
govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be
necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over
men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to
control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A depen-
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Even in a system of separated power, the branches of government
cannot operate in a vacuum. Simply dividing the powers likely would
create a dominant legislature such as those that developed in the early
American colonies." The creation of a system of checks and balances
was intended to prevent such an occurrence." A check is the control
one branch may exert over another, creating the balance of power."
The United States Constitution contains several procedures intended to
bestow different interests and bases of support upon government offi-
cials, and creating obstacles to intra-govemmental interference. 3
Particularly important in a separation of powers system is the exis-
tence of a truly independent judiciary with the power of judicial re-
view.'4 Early commentators noted that the judiciary must only pass
judgment and not make active resolutions." Judges also should retain
life tenure in order to ensure their independence 6 and quality. 7
dence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but
experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
Id.
10. WASSERMAN, supra note 2, at 29. The legislature, as initiator of the lawmak-
ing process, could determine whether the other branches ever exercised their powers.
Id
11. id. at 29.
12. Id. at 29-30.
13. Id. at 30; see, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (stating that the President shall
have legislative power to veto a bill with which he or she does not agree and that
the Congress may check this power with its right to override a presidential veto by a
two-thirds majority vote); U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2 (stating that the Senate shall have
the executive power to confirm presidential appointments of ambassadors and Justices
of the Supreme Court).
14. WASSERMAN, supra note 2, at 34. The concept of judicial review simply
means that the judicial branch retains the power to rule acts of federal, state, and
local governments unconstitutional. Id. It is not specifically mentioned in the United
States Constitution but has been an accepted doctrine in American government for
nearly 200 years. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (holding for
the first time that the Supreme Court possesses the power to determine the constitu-
tionality of acts of Congress and that this power is implicit in the Constitution).
15. See THE FEDERALtST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) reprinted in CLASSIC
READINGS IN AMERICAN PoLITIcs, supra note 7, at 514 (commenting that the judicia-
ry has "neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment").
16. See id. at 517 (explaining that if judges' futures were beholden to either the
executive or legislative branch, a temptation to please that branch would prevail; if
beholden to both branches, a judicial paralysis would likely develop; and if beholden
to the people, decisions would be based on popularity rather than the Constitution).
17. See id. at 518 (noting that a temporary duration on the bench would dis-
courage the most qualified potential jurists from leaving their jobs to serve on the
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These are the basic tenets of the doctrine of separation of powers.
The doctrine, however, is somewhat flexible. Nations may structure their
governments differently while still adhering to these basic principles. 8
II. PRE-SOVIET AND SOVIET HISTORY
Placement in the context of political and cultural history is instructive
in the effort to understand the present-day political situation in the Rus-
sian Federation. Many of the current political and constitutional prob-
lems of Russia are directly attributable to its long history of dictator-
ship.19
The first Slavonic principality, the Kievan Rus, emerged in the year
862 in what is now Ukraine." By the twelfth century, others came into
existence and began expanding, including Novgorod (the center of early
Slavonic culture) and Muscovy (today's Moscow). 21 Soon, however,
these early Russian states were attacked and dominated by the Tartars
for nearly two-hundred and fifty years. In 1480, Muscovy successfully
united the disparate Russian states and overthrew the Tartars.'
Muscovy emerged as the dominant principality and pursued a dual
course of positioning itself as a European power and fulfilling its ambi-
tions to claim the Caucuses, Siberia, and Central and Far East Asia as
its own.24 A turning point in Russia's history occurred in 1721 when
Tsar Peter the Great, after a brutal campaign of "Westernization," offi-
Court).
18. See BERNARD H. SIEGAN, DRAFTING A CONSTITUTION FOR A NATION OR
REPUBLIC EMERGING INTO FREEDOM 14-16 (1994) (explaining that both American-style
presidential systems and European-style parliamentary systems fall within the separa-
tion of powers doctrine). Compare U.S. CONST. (creating a presidential democracy)
with FR. CONST. (creating a presidential-parliamentary democracy).
19. See Alexander Yakovlev, The New Russian Constitution: Social Validity, in
CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 3, 3 (Vladimir V:. Belyakov & Walter J.
Raymond eds., 1994) (explaining that analysis of the new Constitution must include
not only textual examination but also attention to historical developmental factors).
20. THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT LTD., EIU Country Profile 1993-94,
Russia, 3 (1994) [hereinafter EIU PROFILE RUSSIA].
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. This period in Russian history is often referred to as the Tartar yoke. See
generally NICHOLAS V. RIASANOVSKY, A HISTORY OF RUSSIA 11-139 (1984) (detail-
ing the history of pre-Muscovite Russia); MEDIEVAL RUSSIA: A SOURCE BOOK 900-
1700, at 1-162 (Basil Dmytryshyn ed., 1973) (chronicling the history of medieval
Russia through the writings of its people at that time).
24. EIU PROFILE RUSSIA, supra note 20, at 3.
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cially proclaimed Russia to be an empire.' The nineteenth century in
Russia was dominated by the clash between these "Westernizers," who
believed Russia to be European and felt it should follow the same de-
velopmental path as other European powers, and the "Slavophiles," who
felt that Russia was a separate "Euro-Asian" power and should develop
on its own.' By 1813, however, Russia consolidated its status as a
continental power by defeating Napoleon in the War of 1812"
Despite its strong leaders and military, however, Russia's economy
remained weak.' Poor living conditions and continued autocratic rule
spawned many revolutionary movements in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.' Although some reforms were instigated under Tsar
Nicholas II in 1905," they were not enough to ward off the impending
revolution. In 1917, the Romanov Dynasty, under Tsar Alexander fI fi-
nally collapsed.3V ' After a brief period of liberal rule under Alexander
Kerensky, the Bolsheviks, led by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, seized power on
November 7, 1917.32
Communist leaders from Lenin through Gorbachev continued the
tradition of strong central leadership. Instead of a system of capitalist
autocracy, however, the Soviets embarked on an experiment with a
communist economy and a "democratic centralism" form of government. 3
25. Id.
26. Id. Ironically, this debate has undergone a passionate renewal in the aftermath
of the Soviet Union. Id.
27. Id. at 4.
28. Id
29. Id.
30. EIU PROFILE RUSSIA, supra note 20, at 4. These reforms included an unsuc-
cessful attempt at limited political representation through an ineffective parliament,
called the Duma. Under then-Prime Minister Petr Stolypin, reforms aimed at creating
a class of "middle class peasants" were unsuccessfully attempted. Id.; see
RIAsANovsKY, supra note 23, at 404-21 (detailing Nicholas 11's attempted reforms,
their effects on the Russian populace, and the reasons for their failure).
31. Id.
32. Id. See generally RIASANOVSKY, supra note 23, at 143-461 (providing a de-
tailed history of Russia from the rise of Muscovy to the fall of the Romanovs); ME-
DIEVAL RUSSIA: A SouRCE BOOK 900-1700, supra note 23, at 165-333 (tracing the
history of this period through primary source materials); IWPERIAL RUSSIA: A SOURCE
BOOK 1700-1917 (Basil Dmytryshyn ed., 1974) (detailing the history of Tsarist Russia
from Peter the Great to the fall of the Romanovs through primary sources).
33. See KONST. SSSR [Constitution] art. 3 (1977) (describing democratic central-
ism). This document provides that "[t]he organization and activity of the Soviet state
are constructed in accordance with the principle of democratic centralism; ...
[which] combines single leadership with local initiative ..... Id.; see also KONST.
1995] 1369
1370 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y [VOL. 10:4
By the late 1980's, after several years of Gorbachev's reform cam-
paign of perestroika and glasnost,34 popular agitation among the repub-
lics and the citizens of the USSR skyrocketed. 35 By loosening the cen-
tral controls of the Communist Party, Gorbachev inadvertently lost do-
minion over both his domestic empire, and over most of Eastern Eu-
rope.36 On August 19, 1991, a coup attempt, led by communist hard-
liners, failed and took with it the remnants of communist power in the
USSR.37 Shortly thereafter, all fifteen republics, including Russia, de-
clared their independence from the Soviet Union.38
SSSR [Constitution] art. 6 (1977) (explaining the role of the Communist Party within
Soviet society). Specifically, Article Six states:
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the leading and guiding force of
Soviet society, the nucleus of its political system and of [all] state and public
organizations . . . [It] determines general prospects for the development of
society and the lines of the USSR's domestic and foreign policy, directs the
great creative activity of the Soviet people, and gives their struggle for the
victory of communism a planned, scientifically substantiated nature.
Id. See generally John S. Reshetar, Jr., THE SoviET POLITY: GOVERNMENT AND POLI-
TICS IN THE USSR (1989) (detailing the governmental structure and political philoso-
phy of the Soviet Union).
34. See KENNETH KATZNER, ENGLISH-RUSSIAN, RUSSIAN-ENGLISH DICTIONARY
682, 480 (1984) (defining these terms as "rebuilding" and "publicity," respectively).
35. EIU PROFILE RUSSIA, supra note 20, at 4.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 4-5. It is important to note that the Russian Federation itself, although
the dominant republic, was in fact, a captive of the USSR. Id. When the Russian
Federation, under Boris Yeltsin's presidency, left the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev
effectively became irrelevant. Id. at 5. See generally MIKHAIL GORBACHEV,
PERESTROIKA 1987 (describing Gorbachev's vision of a new Soviet Union under a
less totalitarian form of communism); VOICES OF GLASNOST (Stephen F. Cohen &
Katrina vanden Heuvel eds., 1989) (presenting interviews with top reformers in the
Gorbachev Administration).
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I. POST-COMMUNIST CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 9
The adoption of a constitution is one of the most significant events in
a nation's history.' The guiding principle in deciding on the structure
of government should be creation of a division of powers which best
fits current conditions in a given country, in order to promote a stable
and viable system for the future.4 Citizens of the former Soviet Union
have little, if any, experience with democracy. It must be remembered
that democracy is a learned skill and that new constitutions will evolve
over time. 2
A. EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Although the framers of the U.S. Constitution feared the domination
of legislative power over that of the executive, recent history has shown
that democracy has more to fear from a powerful executive.' The
President is usually the only elected official with a truly national constit-
uency. As such, the office is capable of creating a "cult of personality"
which threatens constitutional restraint.' Alternatively, a strong Presi-
39. See CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN LAW INrriATvE, AM ERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, ANALYSIS OF THE CONsTrrTUON OF THE RusSIAN FEDERATrIO
(forthcoming 1995) [hereinafter ABA/CEELI RUSSIA ANALYSIS] (detailing the events
leading up to the adoption of the new Constitution from 1990 through the referendum
on December 12, 1993); see also Dwight Semler, The End of the First Russian
Republic, E. EuR. CONT. REV., Fall 1993/Vinter 1994, at 107, 107-14 (explaining
Boris Yeltsin's Ukaz 1400 which dissolved the Supreme Soviet and provided for
presidential rule until adoption of a new constitution, leading to the deadly
confrontation between parliamentary leaders and presidential forces on October 3.
1993).
40. SiEGAN, supra note 18, at 7. This adoption involves the relinquishment of the
people's rights to a group of fellow citizens. Id. This group is now empowered to
exercise dominion over the populace. Id.
41. Lawrence Lessig, The Path of the Presidency, E. EuR. CoNsT. REv., Fall
1993/Winter 1994, at 104, 104.
42. Id. at 106.
43. Cass Sunstein, Changing Constitutional Powers of the American President. E.
EuR. CONST. REV., Fall 1993/Vinter 1994, at 99, 99.
44. Id. In the United States, although the office of President has evolved from a
relatively weak position to one of great power, this tendency has been checked by a
subjection of presidential acts to judicial review. Id. at 99, 101. Further, all implied
powers stemming from the Constitution are conferred upon Congress rather than the
President so that the more diverse body retains the final say over any expansion of
federal powers. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, 18; see also Lessig, supra note 41, at 105-
06 (explaining the role of the "necessary and proper" clause in keeping presidential
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dent, especially in the unstable republics of the former USSR, may
wield executive power in a manner beneficial to democratic reform.
What is needed, therefore, is a constitutional structure that allows the
branches of government to develop both workable internal systems, and
more importantly, viable systems of cooperation.'
The Russian Constitution clearly violates the doctrine of separated
powers by granting the President disproportionate leverage. 7 Although
it is possible to maintain a democracy without a clear separation of
powers, 8 and strong central control may appear necessary to stabilize
the republic,49 such a structure may prove dangerous to democratic de-
velopment." Additionally, the intention of the document's drafters was
to create a separation of powers system.5 This is explicitly stated in
the Constitution itself"2 Thus, the document set out to create one type
of system, yet created a conflicting one.
In a separation of powers system, the President is the nation's chief
executive officer and is responsible for execution of the country's
laws. 3 The drafters of the new Russian Constitution, however, defined
powers from over-expanding).
45. Sunstein, supra note 43, at 99.
46. Lessig, supra note 41, at 106.
47. ABA/CEELI RussiA ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 38.
48. Id. England is an example of a functioning democracy without a written con-
stitution or clear separation of powers. Id.
49. Id. at 38-39.
50. Id. at 39. Russia has no democratic tradition. Although this Constitution may
help expedite the transition to capitalist democracy, it will not foster a political cul-
ture of decentralization or popular participation. Id.
51. See Irna Muravyeva, Constitution Drafter Praises, Criticizes Final Version,
ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, Nov. 17, 1993, at 1-2, translated in F.B.I.S., USR-93-151,
Dec. 1, 1993 at 1 (interviewing Valeriy Savitskiy, a member of the Russian Constitu-
tional Commission). Mr. Savitskiy explains that the point of the draft was to ensure
separated powers:
God forbid that we should once again start getting subtle and start somehow
combining that power and another one (and sometimes even a third) in one and
the same person, and that will be the end! We will encounter an erosion of the
fundamental principle of a state based on rule of law.
Id.
He further expresses a fear that "transitional elements" in a constitution can
become permanent and that constitutional principles should not be violated even tem-
porarily. Id.
52. KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 10 (1993). See supra note 1 (providing the
full citation of the operative language of this article).
53. SIEGAN, supra note 18, at 14. It is also permissible for the President to exer-
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the presidential role more broadly to include the responsibility of facili-
tating interaction among all the branches.' This effectively gives the
executive branch permission to interfere with other governmental func-
tions. In fact, the presidential system created by the Constitution has
been labeled "superpresidentialism. '55
1. Judicial Powers of the President
As head of state, the President is the sole representative of the Rus-
sian people both internationally and domestically.' Further, the execu-
tive is called upon to guarantee the Constitution and coordinate the
functioning of the entire government." To facilitate this role, the Presi-
dent retains the power to use "reconciliatory procedures" to resolve
intra-govemmental conflicts.58 Thus, the President constitutionally takes
on the traditional role of the judiciary in dispute resolution. The Consti-
tution provides only that the President may refer such disputes to the
courts.59 Therefore, the President may resolve a dispute on terms favor-
able to the executive office and refuse to refer it to the courts for fur-
cise certain legislative powers such as the veto power and formulation of foreign poli-
cy. Id.
54. Constitutional Drafting Committee Stenographic Report-Part 11, RoSSIYSKAYA
GAZETA, Nov. 9, 1993, at 4, translated in F.B.I.S. USR-93-149, Nov. 24, 1993, at 3
[hereinafter Drafting Committee Report].
55. Stephen Holmes, Superpresidentialism and its Problems, E. EUR. CONST.
REV., Fall 1993/Winter 1994, at 123, 123.
56. KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 80.4. "The President of the Russian Federa-
tion, as head of state, shall represent the Russian Federation domestically and in
international relations." Id. This differs significantly from the United States and west-
ern European democracies such as France and Germany where the totality of govern-
ment organs represent the nation internally. ABA/CEELI RUsSIA ANALYSIS, supra note
39, at 18.
57. KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 80.2. "The President shall take measures ...
[to] ensure the coordinated action and interaction of the bodies of state authority." Id.
58. Id. art. 85.1. The Constitution defines the use of these measures: "The Pres-
ident of the Russian Federation may use reconciliatory procedures in order to settle
differences between the bodies of state authority of the Russian Federation, as well as
between the bodies of state authority of Russian Federation members." Id.
59. Id; see also ABA/CEELI RussIA ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 19 (describing
this provision and its implications). This provision could empower the President to
mandate that all intra-govemmental disputes initially be brought to him or her for
resolution. Id. If the President fails to resolve the issue, no requirement appears to
exist that the matter be referred to the courts. Id. The President may possess discre-
tionary power over whether the courts ever hear such matters. Id.
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ther consideration. The President retains similar powers over acts by the
executives of member republics,' again usurping the traditional realm
of the judiciary."
2. Presidential Lawmaking Powers
The Constitution confers upon the President substantial lawmaking
power.62 While the Federal Assembly's power to adopt decrees is lim-
ited to the constitutionally granted spheres of the State Duma63 and
Federation Council,' virtually no checks exist on the President's de-
cree-making powers." The only effective limit to this authority is that
presidential decrees may not contradict the Constitution or federal legis-
lation.' Taken to their logical end, these provisions endow the Presi-
60. KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 85.2. In this case, the President also retains
the power of constitutional interpretation. The Constitution provides: "The President of
the Russian Federation shall be entitled to suspend the acts . . . of executive bodies
of Russian Federation members if they contradict the Constitution of the Russian
Federation . . . until the matter is resolved by the appropriate court." Id. Thus, the
President retains power to interfere with elected local governments in his or her inter-
pretation of a constitutional violation without any initial judicial guidance.
61. ABA/CEELI RussiA ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 19-20. In the short-term
this power may not prove as harmful as it first appears. Id. This arrangement will
help keep political disputes out of the Constitutional Court, and possibly will help the
Court bolster its position as an apolitical entity. Id. at 20.
62. ABA/CEELI RussiA ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 20. This law-making power
is defined as the "[plower of a President, acting alone, to issue legally binding de-
crees that alter the legal rights or responsibilities of citizens." Id.
63. KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 103.2. The State Duma shall adopt resolutions
on the matters that are within its jurisdiction. Id. The Constitution lists each of the
powers within the realm of the State Duma with no provision for granting additional
powers not enumerated. Id. art. 103.1.
64. Id. art. 102.2. This provision is identical to that of the State Duma. Id. It
also provides an enumerated list with no stated exceptions. Id. art. 102.1.
65. Id. arts. 90.1-.2. The Constitution provides that "[t]he President of the Rus-
sian Federation shall issue decrees and directives." Id. art. 90.1. These decrees are
given the power of law. "Decrees and directives of the President of the Russian Fed-
eration shall be binding for execution throughout the territory of the Russian Federa-
tion." Id. art. 90.2. These articles grant the President authority to issue edicts and
decrees that have the force of statutory laws. ABA/CEELI RussiA ANALYSIS, supra
note 39, at 21.
66. KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 90.3. The Constitution does not specifically
state, however, that such laws are automatically invalid. ABA/CEELI RussiA ANALY-
SIS, supra note 39, at 21 n.19. An additional check operates on the executive ability
to declare martial law or a national state of emergency. KONST RFR [Constitution]
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dent with the authority to rule by decree until the Federal Assembly
acts.6' This will likely discourage legislative development and is dan-
gerously reminiscent of Russia's political past.'
art. 102.1(b)-(c).
67. ABA/CEELI RussiA ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 21. Further, Russia's cur-
rent President, Boris Yeltsin, has already exhibited a willingness to rule by decree.
See Sender, supra note 39, at 107-14 (detailing the period of presidential rule imme-
diately preceding the adoption of the new Constitution). More importantly, Yeltsin has
exercised this power under the current Constitution. On June 14, 1994, Yeltsin issued
Ukaz 1226 in response to concerns over organized crime. The decree, which, among
other provisions, allows the police to detain criminal suspects for up to 30 days with-
out formal charges, and dispenses with search warrant requirements, has repeatedly
been condemned by the Duma as unconstitutional. Indeed the Ukaz seems to violate
at least six separate provisions of the Constitution. Despite these possible violations,
Yeltsin refuses to withdraw the decree, and in fact, acknowledges its possible detri-
mental effect on human rights in his country. See Constitution Watch (Russia), E.
Eu. CONST. REv., Summer/Fall 1994, at 18, 20 (describing the details of Ukaz 1226,
the constitutional provisions which it likely violates, and the reactions of various offi-
cials).
68. ABA/CEELI RussiA ANALYSis, supra note 39, at 22. Although such a sys-
tem is expedient, in a nation with no democratic history, it could prove dangerous as
well. Id The drafters, however, were more concerned with assuring these presidential
powers than with their future implications. In the discussions preceding the final ver-
sion of the document, drafters never questioned the intrinsic right of a President to
exercise such power. Id. In deciding on the exact wording of Article 80.3, A.A.
Kotenkov, Chief of the Russian Federation State and Legal Affairs Administration,
argued that "[alecording to the [present draft of the] Constitution [the President] has
the right to define the basic directions of the policy. If we remove this right, then
[the President's] right to interfere in this sphere of activities will always be ques-
tioned." Drafting Committee Report, supra note 54, at 4. Kotenkov, however, did sub-
sequently argue for the provision that presidential direction must remain within Con-
stitutional parameters. Id. at 5.
This decree-making power, however, may already be posing a threat to
constitutionalism. Some commentators note that one year after adoption of the Consti-
tution, the Russian Federation appears to be controlled by the President's Security
Council rather than by the government as a whole. Constitution Watch (Russia), E.
EuR. CONST. REv., Winter 1995, at 23, 24. The Security Council was created in
1992, before adoption of the current Constitution. Id. The present document, however,
does empower the existence of such an organization, although it leaves all specifics to
federal legislation. KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 83(g). The Council is accountable
only to the President, and its decisions easily translate into presidential decrees. Con-
stitution Watch (Russia), supra, at 24. In addition, it operates in complete secrecy and
may demand information from any government authority, while maintaining complete
dominion over its budget. Id. It appears very much like the Politburo of the Soviet
Union. Id. at 24-25.
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3. Presidential Power over Parliament
In addition to law-making power, the Russian President commands
substantial power over the Parliament. 9 In an effort to prevent the pre-
vious clashes between the executive and legislative branches," the doc-
ument grants the President virtual dominion over the lower house of the
Parliament, or State Duma.7" The upper chamber, the Federation Coun-
cil, is immune from presidential dissolution.72
Presidential authority to disband the Duma may be invoked in two
circumstances. The first occurs when the Duma refuses the President's
candidate for Chairman of the Government (Prime Minister) three suc-
cessive times." In this event, the President is constitutionally mandated
to appoint the candidate, dissolve the Duma, and call for new elec-
tions.74
The second circumstance occurs when the Duma issues a vote of no-
confidence in the Government.' In this case, the President may force
resignation of the Government or reject the vote of the Duma. If the
Duma again votes no-confidence within three months, the President must
either announce the resignation of the Government or dissolve the
Duma.76
69. ABA/CEELI RussiA ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 24.
70. See Nikolay Kishkin, TRUD Commentary on Draft Constitution, Moscow
TRUD, Nov. 11, 1993, at 1, translated in F.B.I.S., USR-93-149, at 6 (expressing the
population's interest in preventing intra-governmental clashes, like those of autumn,
1993).
71. See ABA/CEELI RussiA ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 24-26 (outlining the
President's power to dissolve the Duma).
72. Id. at 24. Superficially, this grants the Russian President fewer powers over
Parliament than the French President who may dissolve both chambers. FR. CONST.,
art. 12. The French Constitution states that "[t]he President of the Republic may, after
consultation with the Premier and the Presidents of the assemblies, declare the disso-
lution of the National Assembly." Id.
73. KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 111.4.
74. Id. After such a dissolution, the President should set an election date so that
the new State Duma may convene within four months. KONST. RFR [Constitution] art.
109.2. Further, the Duma cannot be dissolved after filing charges against the President
until the Federation Council has declared a corresponding decision. Id. art. 109.4. It is
also immune from disbandment during a state of emergency or martial law, and in
the six months preceding the expiration of the President's term of office. Id. art.
109.5.
75. KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 117.3. This circumstance occurs when the
State Duma adopts a no-confidence resolution upon a majority vote of the total num-
ber of deputies. Id.
76. Id. This provision is subject to the above-mentioned exceptions stipulated for
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These provisions seem to provide a certain way for the Duma to
prevent disbandment: accede to the President's wishes." Of course, this
is not the ideal way to foster legislative independence. Because there are
no constitutional limitations on who the President may nominate as
Chairman of the Government, the specter of intentional nominations of
unacceptable candidates is not impossible.' Further, it will prove equal-
ly difficult for the Duma to preserve itself by avoiding a vote of
no-confidence in the Government.9 Duma members who are known to
lack conviction in the Government's abilities would be forced to public-
ly lie in order to preserve their positions.' Also, the Duma is com-
posed of 450 members representing thirteen parties (including Indepen-
dents who are counted as one bloc).8 ' These parties represent such dis-
Article 111. Additionally, the Duma may not be dissolved under Article 117.3 within
the first year after its election. Id. art. 109.3.
The Government faced its first threat of a no-confidence vote on October 27,
1994. Constitution Watch (Russia), supra note 68, at 23. Strikingly, the Government
of current-Chairman Viktor Chemomyrdin survived with only 54 out of the 450 depu-
ties voting confidence in his Government. Id. at 23-24. This occurred because, due to
the constitutional mandate for an absolute majority of all Duma deputies in such
votes, KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 117.3, abstentions were counted as votes in
favor of the Government. Constitution Watch (Russia), supra note 68, at 23-24. Such
a high rate of abstentions reveals how difficult it will be to cultivate a parliament
able to formulate and achieve consensus on important issues. Id. at 24.
77. ABAJCEELI RussiA ANALYSis, supra note 39, at 25-26.
78. ABA/CEELI RussiA ANALYSTS, supra note 39, at 25-26. It is entirely possi-
ble that a President, facing an unsupportive Duma, could propose someone known to
be unacceptable three times in a row. After the candidate's rejection, the President
could dissolve the Duma and appoint the Chairman without parliamentary consent. Id.
This situation is exacerbated by the fact that no provision exists in the Constitution
for the new Duma to confirm or reject the Chairman. Thus the President may effec-
tively shuttle his or her choice of Chairman into office while simultaneously disband-
ing an uncooperative, but popularly-elected representative body. Id. Interestingly, in
earlier drafts of this Article, the President could appoint an acting, but not a perma-
nent Chairman in these circumstances. Id. at 25 n.42.
79. Id. at 24.
80. See id. (expressing concern that Duma members will have difficulty voting
confidence in the Government for purely strategic reasons).
81. See EIU PROFilE RussiA, supra note 20, at 8 (presenting a breakdown of the
various parties and number of seats held by each after the December 12, 1993 elec-
tions). The breakdown is as follows:
PARTY SEATS IN STATE DU.IA
Russia's Choice (backed by Boris Yeltsin) 70
Liberal Democrats (backed by Vladimir Zhirinovsky) 64
Communists 48
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parate interests as liberal reformers, ultra-nationalists, and communists. 2
Sufficient accord to ensure the blockage of a forced vote of no-confi-
dence seems unlikely." Rather than strengthen the separation of pow-
ers, these provisions will stifle honest democratic debate and lead to
presidential domination of the Duma.84
4. Appointment, Veto, and Emergency Powers
Ironically, the provisions dealing with presidential appointment author-
ity clearly follow standard separation of powers doctrine.' With only
two exceptions, 6 the executive requires the approval of either the Fed-
eration Council or Duma to appoint top officialsY Recent events, how-
ever, have cast doubt on current-President Boris Yeltsin's commitment





Dignity & Charity 2
Russian Unity & Accord 19
Women of Russia 23
Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms 4
Unlisted Parties 14
Independents 129
Id. The number does not add up to 450 because the election was held to be illegal
in six regions. Id.
82. Id. at 7-8.
83. ABA/CEELI RuSSIA ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 24.
84. ABA/CEELI RussIA ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 24. These provisions further
the Soviet custom of creating officials who must say one thing when they mean
something entirely different. Id. at 25-26.
85. Id. at 27.
86. See KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 83(j)-(k) (stating that the President, acting
alone, possesses authority to appoint and dismiss presidential plenipotentiary represen-
tatives and top commanders of the armed forces). Both types of officials are typically
loyal only to the President. ABA/CEELI RUSsIA ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 27-28.
87. KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 83(a), (d)-(0, (1). Of course, the approval
procedure associated with nomination of the Chairman of the Government (Article
83(a)) could prove entirely artificial if used by the President to dominate the Duma.
See supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing the President's power to dis-
solve the Duma for repeated refusal to confirm the presidential nominee for the
Chairman position).
88. See Dimitri K. Simes, The Imperial Consensus, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 1994,
at Cl, C2 (reporting that, despite three refusals by the Federation Council to confirm
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The President may veto legislation presented by the Federal Assembly
within fourteen days.' In this event, the Assembly may override this
veto by a two-thirds majority vote of the total membership of both
chambers.' In this way, the President can block legislation with the
support of only one-third of either chamber.9' Since the President re-
tains the power to rule by decree, any legislation which is passed effec-
tively chips away at the President's authority to decide the issue in the
future without parliamentary interference.' Thus, the President main-
Alexei Illushenko for the office of Prosecutor-General, current-President Yeltsin contin-
ues to keep him in the position in an "acting" capacity); see also Constitution Watch
(Russia), supra note 68, at 25 (explaining that Illushenko's participation in the com-
mission which incriminated former Vice President Alexei Rutskoi with forged docu-
ments permanently disqualifies him for this position in the opinion of many Feder-
ation Council members). The Kremlin has also proved willing to infringe upon the
State Duma's confirmation powers as well. On October 14, 1994, Viktor
Gerashchenko, the Chairman of the Central Bank. tendered his resignation to the
President who then dismissed Gerashchenko by decree. Id. at 23. This action ignored
Article 103.1(c) which empowers the State Duma to appoint and dismiss the Central
Bank Chairman. KONsT. RFR [Constitution] art. 103.1(c). When the Duma refused to
approve the dismissal, President Yeltsin once again appointed an "acting" Chairman.
Constitution Watch (Russia), supra note 68, at 23. Reportedly, the Duma voted
against the nomination of Tatyana Paramonova for this position only because it had
not yet approved the former Chairman's dismissal. Id. The Duma was attempting to
preserve its check on executive powers by exercising its removal powers. Id. It ap-
pears that the constitutional right of the legislature to maintain the system of checks
and balances by use of its appointment and removal powers is. in reality, merely
illusory. Id.
89. KONsT. RFR [Constitution] art. 107.3. As in the United States, legislation
must pass by a majority vote of both houses. See id. art. 105 (detailing the process
by which legislation must pass in the Duma and Federation Council) and U.S. CoNST.
art. I, § 7 (detailing the process by which legislation becomes law in the United
States).
90. KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 107.3. The constitutional text states:
If after a repeat consideration, the federal law is approved in its previous edi-
tion by a majority vote of at least two-thirds of the total number of the Feder-
ation Council members and State Duma Deputies, it should be signed by the
President of the Russian Federation within seven days and made public.
Id. The document is silent as to whether the legislation becomes law in the event the
President refuses to sign the previously vetoed bill. It only provides that he or she
should sign it. Id.
91. Id. Although the President of the United States possesses the same power, the
context in which it is used is quite different. ABA/CEELI RUSSIA ANALYSIS, supra
note 39, at 26.
92. ABAICEELI RUSSIA ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 27. An analogous situation
in the United States would occur if the Congress passed a law which grants the
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tains an interest in vetoing legislation in order to preserve maximum
executive power. 3 If, however, the Assembly overrides a veto, the
President "should" sign the bill into law within seven days.9"
Russia's President may impose martial law "in the event of aggres-
sion" and must notify the Federal Assembly immediately of such an
occurrence.95 Unfortunately, the term "aggression" is not defined." Al-
though there is no constitutional provision for the declaration of war, the
President cannot use Russian forces outside Russian territory without the
consent of the Federation Council.'
5. Impeachment of the President
The procedure for impeachment of the President is somewhat more
difficult in the Russian Constitution than in the U.S. Constitution, al-
though the grounds for charges are similar.98 The Duma may consider
President legislative power over anything it has not yet considered. Of course, this
would be unconstitutional. Id. In this situation, each new statute would diminish this
presidential power. Id. Clearly, the President now has a vested interest in vetoing
legislation where he or she did not have such an interest before. Id.
93. Id. In the United States, presidential law-making authority is subject to con-
gressional constraint. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952) (ruling, in part, that the President may not use executive powers to
thwart the expressed will of Congress).
94. KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 107.3. The Constitution remains silent regard-
ing a presidential refusal to actually sign the legislation.
95. Id. art. 87.2.
96. ABA/CEELI RussIA ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 29. Such vagueness may
leave open the possibility of abuse. Id.
97. KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 102.2. This is extremely important because
the President does not have the power to dissolve the Council in case of repeated
disagreement. ABA/CEELI RussiA ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 29. Unfortunately,
current-President Yeltsin has not felt constrained to check with the Assembly before
using Russian forces against rebellious factions within Russian borders. See Simes,
supra note 88, at C2 (stating that Yeltsin failed to consult with either body of the
Federal Assembly before launching the covert actions against Chechnya which later
developed into a massive military operation). In fact, the decision to invade the seces-
sionist territory of Chechnya was made by the President's secretive Security Council.
Constitution Watch (Russia), supra note 68, at 23. Some commentators now believe
this mysterious and unelected executive body to be the most powerful group of peo-
ple in the Federation. Id. The constitutional impotence of the Parliament has likely
led to the executive branch's unilateral decision to launch this war. Id.
98. ABA/CEELI RuSsIA ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 31-32. A Russian President
can be impeached for "high treason or another grave crime." KONST. RFR [Constitu-
tion] art. 93.1. In the United States, the grounds are "Treason, Bribery, or other high
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charges if one-third of its members back the measure and may indict on
a two-thirds majority vote." The Supreme Court and Constitutional
Court then confirm the legality of this ruling."° The Federation Coun-
cil then has up to three months in which to decide whether to remove
the President from office.' An apparent problem with this system,
however, is that it leaves open the possibility that the President could be
removed from office on the strength of charges for which he or she ulti-
mately could be found innocent in a court of law."
6. Conclusions
Although some argue that current conditions in Russia necessitate a
dominant presidency," the potential and actual abuses of such power
Crimes and Misdemeanors." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
99. KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 93.2. The provision also mandates that in ad-
dition to the concurrence of one-third of the State Duma deputies, there must be an
affirmative vote to advance the charges by a special commission set up within the
State Duma for this purpose. Id.
100. Id. art. 93.1. The Supreme Court affirms that the charges, if proved, consti-
tute the elements of the crime charged and the Constitutional Court confirms that the
proper filing procedures were observed. ABA/CEELI Russia Analysis, supra note 39,
at 32.
101. KONsT. RFR [Constitution] art. 93.3. If the Council fails to rule within three
months, the charges will be automatically dropped. Id. The Council must produce a
two-thirds majority vote in order to unseat the President. Id. art. 93.2.
102. ABA/CEELI RussIA ANALYsts, supra note 39, at 32. Of course, this is also
a possibility under the provisions of the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
This section provides that "Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend fur-
ther than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy an Office of
honor, Trust or Profit under the United States." Id. Interestingly, the Russian Constitu-
tion appears to confer upon the President unlimited immunity. KoNsT. RFR [Constitu-
tion] art. 91. The document simply states that "IT]he President of the Russian Federa-
tion shall have immunity." Id. In contrast, members of the Federal Assembly enjoy
immunity only during their term of office. Id. art. 98.1. Further, they can lose their
inviolability when caught locus delicti or on the recommendation of the Prosecutor-
General. Id. arts. 98.1-.2. Since limitations are elaborated for members of the Federal
Assembly but not for the President, it is possible that the President enjoys total im-
munity from criminal prosecution for any act committed while in office. ABAICEELI
RussiA ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 32. If this is the case, then the impeachment
provision is quite different from that in the U.S. Constitution which provides no im-
munity for criminal acts performed while in office. See U.S. COST. art. I. § 3 (pro-
viding that "the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment,
Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law"). Id.
103. See Ninel S. Krylova, The New Constitution of Russia: Main Principles and
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have led most observers to criticize the conglomeration of such massive
powers in one person, especially in light of Russia's political histo-
ry." Additionally, the association of democracy in Russia with a sin-
gle person can prove dangerous to the future of reform. If the people
become disillusioned with their President, they likely will become dis-
illusioned with the democracy he or she represents. 5
B. THE GOVERNMENT
Legislatively created agencies and ministries, which administer regula-
tions, have recently emerged as a fourth branch of government."° Rus-
sia, like most European democracies, has established a dual executive
branch by creating a Government, headed by the Chairman, which exer-
cises executive authority. 7 Although the Government's functions fall
mainly within the administrative realm, it may initiate legislation con-
ceming specific areas' and retains the power of decree in order to
carry out this function, subject to the President's tacit approval."°
Features, 27 AKRON L. REV. 397, 404 (1994) (arguing that the instability of Russia's
party system necessitates a strong presidential role).
104. See, e.g., ABA/CEELI RusSiA ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 17, 22 (express-
ing apprehension that the substance of the Russian President's powers may inhibit the
creation of a new tradition of separated powers in Russia); Holmes, supra note 55, at
123 (explaining that the system of "superpresidentialism" set up in this document
could prove problematic in the future, especially in the event of the sudden incapacity
of a sitting President); Edward W. Walker, Politics of Blame and Presidential Powers
in Russia's New Constitution, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Fall 1993/Winter 1994, at 116,
116 (arguing that the presidential provisions of the new Russian Constitution contain
"all the brittleness of the U.S. Constitution but lack its balanced division of powers").
105. Walker, supra note 104, at 119. Polish democracy, however, has flourished
despite the declining popularity of current-President Lech Walesa, largely because
democracy and painful reforms are not regarded by the population as synonymous
with one person. Id.
106. SIEGAN, supra note 18, at 19. Although (or perhaps, because) the persons
responsible for the functioning of these ministries are not elected, they must be sub-
jected to constitutional controls. Id.
107. KONST. RFR [Constitution] arts. 110.1-.2; see also ABA/CEELI RUSSIA
ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 22 (describing this dual authority).
108. KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 114.1. The Government's powers of legislative
initiative include: submitting the federal budget to the State Duma and reporting on
its implementation; ensuring a uniform financial, monetary, and credit policy for the
Russian Federation; ensuring a uniform social and environmental policy within the
Federation; managing federal property; carrying out defense and foreign policy mea-
sures; executing measures to ensure human rights, property tights, and to combat
crime; and carrying out other federal laws and presidential decrees. Id.
109. Id. art. 115.1. Although binding, this decree power is subordinate to the will
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The President's power over the Government is further bolstered by
the previously discussed ability to dissolve either the Government or the
Duma in case of disagreement between the branches."' Thus, the Pres-
ident commands a great deal of loyalty from the Government by the
ability to both protect and discipline it."' Additionally, the President
may preside over Government sessions, further establishing presidential
superiority."' The Government may not even resign on its own; presi-
dential approval is needed."'
C. THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
Unlike many newly emerging former Soviet republics, the Russian
Federation created a bicameral legislature."4 The Federal Assembly
consists of an upper house, the Federation Council, and a lower house,
the State Duma."5 Legislative action is accomplished either through
joint action of both houses" 6 or through independent decree of either
of the President. The President may rescind such edicts if they contradict the Consti-
tution, federal laws, or decrees of the President. Id. arts. 115.2-3.
110. Id. arts. 117.2-.4.
111. ABAICEELI RussiA ANALYSIs, supra note 39, at 22-23. Such superiority cre-
ates a system more like that in the United States than in this Constitution's "paper
cousin" in France. Ld. at 22. Most parliamentary systems, even those with strong
presidencies such as France, confer upon the legislature the ability to control the
existence of the Government. Id. at 23; FR. CONST. art. 50. Additionally, the French
Constitution allows the President to dissolve the Government only when the Govern-
ment itself presents its resignation to the President. Id. art. 8. By contrast, the United
States Congress retains virtually no power over the continued tenure of members of
the administrative agencies. ABA/CEELI RussIA ANALYsIs, supra note 39, at 23; see
also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (holding that one house may not
take part in the removal of an administrative official).
112. KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 83(b). "The President of the Russian Federa-
tion shall be entitled to preside over sessions of the Government of the Russian Fed-
eration." Id. This provision, however, may prove to be harmless. The French Constitu-
tion also provides that "[Tihe President of the Republic shall preside over the Council
of Ministers." FR. CONST. art. 9.
113. KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 117.1. The President may reject the
Government's resignation. Id.
114. Compare KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 95 (describing the composition of
the bicameral Federal Assembly) with LiTH. CONST. art. 55 (describing the unicameral
Seimas) and TAJIK CONST. art. 49 (describing the unicameral Majlisi Milli).
115. KONsT. RFR [Constitution] art. 95.1.
116. Id. art. 105. The process of lawmaking in the Federal Assembly proceeds as
follows: federal laws are adopted by a majority votes of the total number of State
Duma deputies. Id. art. 105.1. These laws are submitted to the Federation Council
1995] 1383
1384 AM. U. J. INTL L. & POL'Y [VOL. 10:4
chamber within its sphere of sole jurisdiction."7 The only requirements
for membership in the Duma are that a candidate has reached twenty-
one years of age and is eligible to vote in the Russian Federation."'
No constitutional requirements for members of the Federation Council
appear to exist."9 No person may serve in both houses simulta-
neously.'2
The constitutional drafters were clearly interested in preventing repeat-
ed clashes between the executive and legislative branches.' They cre-
ated, however, a system that undermines the supremacy of the Parlia-
ment in legislative matters and instead confers this authority upon the
President, thus defeating the separation of powers.' A further irony is
within five days of their passage in the Duma. Id. art. 105.3. If a majority of the
total number of deputies of the Federation Council vote for the law, or if the Council
fails to consider the legislation within 14 days, it will be deemed adopted. Id. art.
105.4. If the Federation Council rejects the legislation, both houses may convene a
reconciliatory commission to settle their differences, and then resubmit the legislation
for consideration by the Duma. Id. If the Federation Council again rejects the bill,
the Duma may still enact the legislation if two-thirds of its membership vote in favor
of it. Id. art. 105.5
117. Id. arts. 102 (Federation Council), 103 (State Duma). Interestingly, the Presi-
dent retains the power to issue binding decrees unilaterally with no jurisdictional limi-
tations. Id. art. 90; ABA/CEELI RUSSIA ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 33-34; see su-
pra notes 55-63 and accompanying text (explaining that the President's lawmaking
powers, unlike those of the Federal Assembly, lack jurisdictional limitations).
118. KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 97.1. Interestingly, in the United States, one
must attain the age of 25 before they are eligible for election to the House of Repre-
sentatives. U.S. CONST, arts. I, § 2. In France, there is no constitutional age re-
quirement. See FR. CONST. arts. 24-33 (detailing the French Parliament but not men-
tioning qualifications).
119. See KONST. RFR [Constitution] arts. 94-109 (detailing the composition and
duties of both houses of the Federal Assembly but failing to note any mandatory
qualifications for election to the Federation Council). There is no apparent explanation
for this discrepancy.
120. Id. art. 97.2. The prohibition states, "No individual shall be a member of the
Federation Council and a deputy of the State Duma simultaneously." Id.
121. Kishkin, supra note 70, at 6. One commentator explains, "But having ob-
served the destructive congressional battles, we are very interested in how we are in-
sured against a repetition of the skirmishes between the two authorities and their wars
of mutual annihilation." Id. Unfortunately, the quest to avoid such confrontations re-
sulted in a system which deprives the legislature of its traditional role as primary
lawmaker. ABA/CEELI RUSSIA ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 36-37.
122. See ABA/CEELI RUSSIA ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 36-37 (discussing the
fact that no preference for legislative lawmaking exists over presidential decree-making
in the Constitution); see also supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (discussing
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that although all laws must pass the State Duma in order to be consid-
ered by the Federation Council or the President, the President may dis-
solve the Duma." This exacerbates the weakness of the already fragile
legislative system. One of the few advantages to the new system is that
it ends the former Soviet practice of allowing the legislative body to
change the Constitution to suit its own desires.'
1. Federation Council
The Federation Council is immune from dissolution by the Presi-
dent It is composed of a representative from the legislative and ex-
this concept in detail).
123. KONST. RFR [Constitution] arts. 1173-.4; ABAICEELI RUSSIA ANALYSIS,
supra note 39, at 33-34.
124. See Kishkin, supra note 70, at 6 (explaining that the new procedure for
amendments will eliminate such maneuvering). Compare KONST. RFR [Constitution]
arts. 134-137 with KONsT. SSSR [Constitution] art. 174 (1977) (detailing the proce-
dure for amendment to the respective constitutions). It was, in fact, so easy to amend
the last Soviet Constitution, that over 300 amendments were added to it. Krylova,
supra note 103, at 397. The Soviet Constitution of 1977 provided, "The USSR Con-
stitution is changed by a decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet, adopted by a majori-
ty of at least two-thirds of the total number of Deputies in each of its chambers."
KONST. SSSR [Constitution] art. 174. The procedure for amending the present Con-
stitution of the Russian Federation is significantly more complex and depends upon
which provision the proponents wish to amend. The President, the State Duma, the
Federation Council, the Government, or any of the legislative bodies of the members
of the Russian Federation may propose an amendment, provided they have the support
of a group of at least one-fifth of the deputies of the State Duma or of the members
of the Federation Council. KONsT. RFR [Constitution] art. 134. Any change to Chap-
ters One (Principles of the Constitutional System), Two (Human and Civil Rights and
Freedoms), or Nine (Constitutional Amendments and Revision of the Constitution) re-
quires a supermajority of three-fifths of the total membership of both houses of Par-
liament. Id. art. 135.2. If such a supermajority is reached, a Constitutional Assembly
shall be convened to either affirm the integrity of the current Constitution or to draft
a new one. Id art. 135.3. A new Constitution becomes law if either two-thirds of the
members of the Constitutional Assembly vote for it or if, in a national vote, more
than half of those voting cast their ballots in its favor (conditioned upon a majority
of the registered electorate participating). d Amendments to Chapters Three through
Eight (organization of the Federation, and composition and functioning of local and
federal government), are passed by the same procedure as adoption of a federal con-
stitutional law and with the consent of two-thirds of the legislatures of the members
of the Federation. Id. art. 136. Changes to Article Sixty-five, which lists the members
of the Russian Federation, are achieved by federal constitutional law governing the
admission of new members and changes to the status of present members of the
Russian Federation. Id. art. 137.1.
125. See KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 109 (providing for the possibility of the
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ecutive branches of each of the eighty-nine constituent subjects of the
Russian Federation."' 6 In addition to its joint lawmaking powers with
the Duma, it retains several important areas of sole jurisdiction includ-
ing: approval of border changes among internal republics;27 approval
of presidential decrees of martial law"2 and state of emergency; 29
and what appears to be formal authority to declare war.3 '
2. The State Duma
In contrast to the Federation Council, the State Duma remains one of
the more controversial creations of the new Constitution due to its reli-
ance on the President for its continued existence.' Although the pow-
er of the Duma to confirm presidential nominations for Chairman of the
Government" appears impressive on paper, it is illusory. Disputes
with the President on this matter could prove fatal to the Duma.' a
dissolution of the State Duma, but not the Federation Council).
126. Id. art. 95.2. The main function of the Federation Council is not direct popu-
lar representation as in the State Duma, but representation of the interests of the
member Republics of the Russian Federation. ABA/CEELI RUSSIA ANALYSIS, supra
note 39, at 34.
127. KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 102.1(a).
128. Id. art. 102.1(b).
129. Id. art. 102.1(c).
130. Id. art. 102.1(d). It is unclear why no formal war powers are expressed in
the Constitution. Although the Council has final power over whether to use Russian
forces outside the Federation's borders, the question remains whether the President
could unilaterally order missiles to be sent abroad. ABA/CEELI RUSSIA ANALYSIS,
supra note 39, at 34. The Council also possesses certain appointment and removal
powers. KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 102.1(e) These powers include: power to call
presidential elections; id.; removal of the President from office by impeachment; id.
art. 102.1(f), see supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text (discussing the procedure
for impeachment and removal of the President); appointment of judges to the Consti-
tutional Court, Supreme Court, and Supreme Court of Arbitration; id. art. 102.1(g);
appointment and removal of the general prosecutor of the Russian Federation; id. art.
102.1(h); and appointment and removal of the Deputy Chairman of the Accounting
Chamber and half of the Chamber's auditors; id. art. 102.1(i).
131. KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 117.3. This provision allows the President to
dissolve the State Duma in the event the Duma expresses no-confidence in the Gov-
ernment three successive times. Id.
132. Id. art. 103.1(a). This provision states, "The State Duma shall have the power
to approve the nominee of the President of the Russian Federation to the office of
the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation." Id.
133. ABA/CEELI RUSSIA ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 35. The Constitution may,
in fact, coerce acquiescence by the Duma to the President's choice of Chairman of
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Other powers of the Duma include: appointment of the Chair of the
Central Bank;'u appointment and removal of the Chairman of the Ac-
counting Chamber and half of its auditors;' appointment of a Human
Rights Commissioner," power to grant amnesty;' and power to
bring charges against the President in order to impeach."
The Duma is composed of 450 elected deputies."" The membership
appears divided into highly factionalized blocs," however, and will
likely find it difficult to conduct itself in an efficient and beneficial
manner.' 4' Although in the short-term, a weak Duma may aid demo-
the Government. It provides: "After the State Duma rejects three candidates to the
office of Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, the President ...
shall appoint the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, dissolve
the State Duma, and call new elections." KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 111.4.
134. Id. art. 103.1(c).
135. Id. art. 103.1(d). But see supra note 88 (explaining how current-President
Yeltsin disregarded the spirit of this provision).
136. Id. art. 103.1(e).
137. Id. art. 103.1(f).
138. Id. art. 103.1(g). Once the Duma lodges formal accusations against the Presi-
dent, the President loses the power to dissolve it. Id. art. 109.4.
139. Id. art. 95.3.
140. THE ECONOmiST INTELLIENCE UNIT LiirTED, EIU COUNTRY REPORT, Rus-
SIA, 1ST QUARTER (1994), at 11 [hereinafter EIU REPORT RussiA]. See also supra
note 81 and accompanying text (presenting a breakdown of the individual parties
comprising the membership of the State Duma).
141. Id. The autumn 1994 legislative session produced no laws of major import.
Constitution Watch (Russia), supra note 68, at 27. Although 222 laws originally ap-
peared on the docket of the State Duma, only 59 were actually considered. Of those
laws, it is questionable how many were seriously considered. Id. Legislation consid-
ered but not passed included: the laws on presidential and parliamentary elections,
privatization, the criminal code, and the 1995 budget. Id. In fact, of the 12 federal
constitutional laws needed for complete implementation of the Constitution, only one,
the Law on the Constitutional Court, has been passed. Id. This law is mandated by
Article 128.3 of the Constitution. KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 128.3. Unfortunately,
key provisions of this law missed their implementation deadline and are currently
being ignored. Constitution Watch (Russia), supra note 68, at 26; see infra note 163
(providing analysis and explanation of this situation). The other constitutionally man-
dated federal constitutional laws are: Law on the State of Emergency, Ko.sT. RFR
[Constitution] art. 56.1; Law on the Order of Creating New Subjects of the Russian
Federation, id. art. 65.2; Law on the Change of the Statute of Subjects of the Rus-
sian Federation, id. art. 66.5; Law on the Flag, State Arms and National Anthem of
the Russian Federation, id. art. 70.1; Law on Referendum, id. art. 84(c); Law on the
Regime of Martial Law, id. art. 87.3; Law on the Ombudsman, id. art. 103(d); Law
on the Government, id. art. 114.2; Law on the Court System, id. art. 118.3: Law on
the Supreme Court, id. art. 128.3; Law on the Highest Arbitrage Court (Supreme
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cratic reform by allowing current-President Yeltsin to pass measures
without the factionalized and heavily conservative body, this approach
could backfire in the future if an anti-reformer should ascend to the
presidency. 4
3. Compatibility
One of the more perplexing articles in the Constitution appears in the
Concluding and Transitional Provisions section of the document. 43
This article allows for a deputy in the first convocation of the Duma to
simultaneously serve as a Government minister.' Passionate opposi-
tion to this provision exists. One of the document's drafters, Valeriy
Savitskiy, has expressed fear that such "deputy-ministers" would be
unable to provide an accounting from the Government because they
would be the Government.45 Further, "transitional provisions" may eas-
ily become permanent provisions.'" The underlying fear is that if the
compatibility provision becomes permanent, the President may use his or
her ministers to "stage manage" the Duma's functions.'47 This will fur-
ther undermine the independence of an already weak legislature.'"
Alternatively, many argue that compatibility may prove to be benefi-
cial, and actually bolster Parliament's authority.'49 Because the major
Court of Arbitration), id. art. 128.3; Law on the Federal Courts, id.; Law on the
Constitutional Assembly, id. art. 135.2. As of January, 1995, none of these laws has
been passed. Edward W. Walker, Designing Center-Region Relations in the New Rus-
sia, E. EutR. CONST. REV., Winter 1995, at 54, 60.
142. Walker, supra note 141, at 14. The prospect of Vladimir Zhirinovsky or a
like-minded ultra-nationalist assuming the Russian presidency with its massive powers
does not bode well for future reform or stability. Id.
143. KONST. RFR [Constitution] Concluding and Transitional Provisions, art. 9.
144. Id. Such a person gives up their legislative immunity. Id.
145. Muravyeva, supra note 51, at 1. Savitskiy continues by criticizing the possi-
ble "snowballing" effect of such a provision, "Would the next stage then be to com-
bine the office of judge and the office of deputy?" Id.
146. Id. Savitskiy explains: "Nothing can be more permanent than a transitional
period. That 'transitional' element can become deeply rooted. Fundamental principles
should not be violated, even for a transitional period." Id.
147. See Stephen Holmes & Christian Lucky, Storm Over Compatibility, E. EUR.
CONST. REV., Fall 1993/Winter 1994, at 120, 120-21 (detailing the arguments against
compatibility).
148. Id. The authors argue that opposition to compatibility provisions stems from
an historical suspicion of and animosity toward the executive branch by the legislative
branch. Id. at 121.
149. Id. at 122. The argument is set forth that democratic reformers should sup-
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problem in post-Soviet government has been executive-parliamentary
gridlock, 5' compatibility may provide a link between the branches that
will foster cooperation.' Compatibility also contradicts the popular as-
sumption that the President and the Parliament cannot work together
productively. 2 It remains to be seen which view will prevail.
D. THE JUDICIARY
Whether the President and Parliament adhere to the Constitution de-
pends largely on the effectiveness of judicial enforcement.5 The Con-
stitution provides for a Constitutional Court,'" a Supreme Court,'" a
Supreme Court of Arbitration, and for the development of various
lower courts." Because the Constitutional Court is the only judicial
body endowed with the ability to rule on the constitutionality of laws
and government acts,'58 it is the most important segment of the judi-
ciary for the purposes of examining the interaction of the other branch-
es. The power of judicial review belongs solely to the Constitutional Court.'
port compatibility because it eases the Constitution's strong bias toward the executive
branch by allowing deputies of the State Duma a voice in executive matters. Id.
150. Id.
151. ld.
152. Id. It is suggested that compatibility will work to moderate the severity of
presidential rule and parliamentary weakness because the executive will be less likely
to ignore the Duma if he or she retains some influence within it. Id. Vice Premier
Alexander Shokhin explains:
ITihe experience of the separation of powers in the Russian Federation until
recently has shown that an abstract scheme of separation of powers is fraught
with confrontation which sometimes erupts into direct struggle. Therefore the
inclusion of cabinet ministers in the process of law-making makes it possible to
make laws that are realistic and enforceable.
Press Conference by RF Vice-Premier Alexander Shokhin on RF-EC Relations, Official
Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, Nov. 9, 1993, available in WESTLAW, News Library,
Current Events file. Obviously, this situation is not ideal, but it may prove helpful
during the transitional period. Holmes & Lucky, supra note 147, at 122.
153. ABA/CEELI RUSSIA ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 40. In determining the ef-
fectiveness of the constitutional articles on the judiciary, one must also take into
consideration the other various substantive and procedural articles distributed through-
out the document. Id.
154. KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 125. Due to the constraints of this comment,
only the Constitutional Court will be discussed in depth.
155. Id. art. 126.
156. Id. art. 127.
157. Id. art. 128.3.
158. Id. arts. 125.2-.6.
159. Herman Schwartz, The New East European Constitutional Courts, in CONSTI-
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1. History of the Constitutional Court
The communist legacy is not one that fosters the notion of an inde-
pendent judiciary. Before the onset of perestroika, the concept of an
independent body endowed with the authority to judge actions of the
leadership did not exist."6 The Constitutional Court was actually estab-
lished in October, 1991,6' well before passage of the new Constitution
in December, 1993. It started out as fiercely independent under the
leadership of former Court Chairman Valery Zorkin." The structure
and functioning of the Court changed somewhat under the new Constitu-
tion and Court Act.
TUTION MAKING IN EASTERN EUROPE 163, 165 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1993). The
importance of judicial review in preventing the majority from depriving minorities of
life, liberty, and property cannot be overstated. Id. Alexis de Tocqueville wrote:
If it be admitted that a man, possessing absolute power, may misuse that power
by wronging his adversaries, why should a majority not be liable to the same
reproach? . . . I can never willingly invest any number of my fellow creatures
with that unlimited authority which I should refuse to any of them.
SIEGAN, supra note 18, at 23 (quoting 1 ALExIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 249 (1835)).
When considering the Constitutional Court, it is important to recognize the
difference between such courts and the U.S. Supreme Court. Where the U.S. Supreme
Court is the court of last resort for any type of case and is part of the federal judi-
ciary, a constitutional court of the European type serves a different purpose. Schwartz,
supra, at 164-65. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (providing, "The judicial Power shall
extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authori-
ty . . . "). These constitutional courts do not hear litigation between parties. Schwartz,
supra. Their sole function is constitutional interpretation and they may issue opinions
regardless of whether an actual case or controversy exists. Id. Normally, they are the
only court granted the power to rule on constitutional issues. Contra U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2 (limiting United States federal courts' jurisdiction to actual cases or contro-
versies).
160. Schwartz, supra note 159, at 177. Judicial authority resided in the leadership
of the Communist Party. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. Among the Court's most controversial decisions was its invalidation of
Boris Yeltsin's presidential decree ordering the merger of the ISS (successor to the
KGB) and the MVD (internal security). Yeltsin issued the decree in December, 1991
and appointed a personal friend to run the consolidated agency. The merger evoked
Russian fears of the Stalinist purges that occurred after the last such integration in
1936. Id. at 178. In its ruling, the Court held the decree to violate the separation of
powers of the RSFSR Constitution and declared the presidential decree to be void. Id.
at 201 n.84. Reportedly it took Chairman Zorkin an hour to convince President
Yeltsin that he was obligated to obey the Court's order. Id. at 181.
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2. The Court Under the New Constitution
The present Constitutional Court consists of nineteen judges," with
tenures of twelve years.' Its jurisdiction includes constitutional inter-
pretation," determination of the constitutional validity of federal"
and local governmental acts,'" and resolution of disputes among the
other branchess or between the federal and local governments.tw The
Court also has the authority to rule on constitutional issues arising in
particular lower court cases at the request of those courts.' There is,
however, no explicit grant of discretion given to the Court. It may prove
difficult for the Court to rule on every request for interpretation from
the other courts.'
A possible danger stemming from the ability of the Court to issue
advisory opinions is that it may become too closely affiliated with the
163. KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 125.1. This is an increase over the original
panel of thirteen judges. ABA/CEELI RussiA ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 40. Presi-
dent Yeltsin signed the Constitutional Court Act on July 21, 1994. Constitution Watch
(Russia), supra note 68, at 25. According to Part 5, Article 2 of the Law, the Feder-
ation Council was to approve all Constitutional Court justices by August 21, 1994. Id.
Unfortunately, no procedure exists for failure to comply with this deadline and as of
January, 1995, one vacancy remains on the Court. See id. at 25-26 (detailing the
various presidential nominees to the Court and the Federation Council's reasons for
rejecting most of them).
Due to confusion over what constitutes a working quorum, the Court has yet to
begin functioning under the new Constitution. Id. at 26. Several current justices op-
pose commencing work until the last position is filled. Id. They argue that the Presi-
dent and Federation Council may decide not to fill the last position once the Court
begins functioning. Id. This vacancy, they assert, will erode the Court's legitimacy as
it will appear to the public as an incomplete body. Id. In fact, it is not entirely clear
that the current President desires to see a functioning Constitutional Court. Id. at 25.
Such a body may question the constitutionality of presidential rule by decree. Id.
164. Constitution Watch (Russia), supra note 67, at 19. The Constitutional Court
Act reduced the judges' tenure from life to 12 years. Id. The problems associated
with limited tenure for judges are discussed supra note 17. Whether these concerns
apply in this situation remains to be seen.
165. KONsT. RFR [Constitution] art. 125.5.
166. Id. art. 125.2(a).
167. Id. art. 125.2(b).
168. Id. art. 125.3(a).
169. Id. art. 125.3(b).
170. Id. art. 125.4.
171. ABA/CEELI RussiA ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 40. Because the Court can
not exercise discretion as to which cases it will hear, the sheer number of requests
may prove unworkable. Id.
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governmental bodies requesting the opinions. In that case, the Court
could become merely an executive agency rather than an independent
entity.7 2 Furthermore, because virtually any government official can
request such a ruling, the Court may become overwhelmed with requests
for rulings on every dispute within the legislature.1
3
The Russian Constitutional Court is the only court in the Federation
which can declare a law to be unconstitutional. 74 Added to the already
liberal ability of the government to solicit the Court's opinion and the
Court's seeming inability to reject requests, 7 the sheer number of is-
sues this will likely bring before the Court will make it nearly impossi-
ble for the judges to fulfill their constitutional mandates.76
A further complication of the system of referral is that it creates a
heavily one-sided system which favors the government over private
parties."v If a lower court finds no constitutional conflict, it will not
refer the issue to the Constitutional Court. Only an entity with constitu-
tional authority to appeal a case may do so.' Most government bod-
ies have this authority while private citizens do not.' If a lower
court, therefore, rules in favor of a law's constitutionality and against an
individual, that citizen has no right of appeal. 8
172. Id. at 40-41. In this case the Court loses its effectiveness as a check on
executive power. Id. at 41.
173. Id. at 41.
174. KONST. RFR [Constitution] arts. 125-27. Article 101 of the Constitutional
Court Act authorizes all courts to refer any constitutional issue to the Constitutional
Court. Vladimir Chetvemin, Three Questions to the Authors of the Act, E. EUR.
CONST. REV. Summer/Fall 1994, at 80-81.
175. See KONsT. RFR [Constitution] art. 125.5 (mandating that the Constitutional
Court, "shall interpret the Constitution of the Russian Federation at the request of the
President . . . the Federation Council, the State Duma, the Government . . . and the
bodies of legislative power of the members of the Russian Federation"). There is no
mention of a concurrent ability of the Court to reject requests at its discretion. Id.
176. See Chetvemin, supra note 174, at 81 (arguing that because most cases in-
volve some type of constitutional issue, the Court will be inundated with referrals). A
suggested compromise to lighten the Court's burden is to allow lower courts to deal
with issues arising under laws held over from before the passage of the new constitu-
tion. These laws were created under a very different system and should not be af-
forded the same deference as those emerging under the current Constitution. Id.
177. Schwartz, supra note 159, at 174.
178. KONsT. RFR [Constitution] art. 125.5.
179. See id. arts. 125.2-125.4 (outlining the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court
and who may seek its opinion).
180. Schwartz, supra note 159, at 174. Citizens challenging a law will appear
before the Constitutional Court only if they have won in a lower courts. The govern-
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Among the more blatant violations of traditional separation of powers
doctrine is the inclusion of legislative initiative among the Court's privi-
leges.' The Court's objectivity may be severely compromised should
a law it originally proposed come before it on a constitutional chal-
lenge." In addition, the citizenry's confidence in the fledgling court
system may suffer due to even the appearance of a conflict of inter-
est."
In contrast, the Constitution withholds several areas of traditional
court jurisdiction from the Court and instead gives them to the Presi-
dent.L ' The President is the guarantor of the Constitution and of the
civil rights and freedoms of the Russian citizenry." The President also
assures the coordinated functioning of the organs of government." It
appears that the Court only hears intra-governmental disputes when the
President refers such disputes to it." Traditionally, the judiciary has
been considered the final guarantor of these provisions." Although the
ment, however, may challenge any lower court ruling with which it disagrees. Id. at
174. This places substantial power in the lawmakers to ensure that their own laws
remain valid. See id. at 174-75 (arguing that such a system will work largely to the
government's advantage).
181. KONsT. RFR [Constitution] art. 104.1. The Supreme Court and Supreme Court
of Arbitration also retain this power. Id. Interestingly, the former Soviet Republic of
Tajikistan reverses this situation. See CENTRAL AND EAST EURoPEAN LAW INrTIATIVE,
AMmuCAN BAR ASSOCIATION ANALYSIS OF THE DRFr CONSTrrrTION OF THE REPUB-
LIC OF TAmUSTAN 6 (1994) [hereinafter ABAICEELI TAJIKISTAN ANALYSIS] (describ-
ing the Majlisi Milli, or National Assembly of Tajikistan, and its powers). The Tajik
Constitution empowers the Majlisi Milli to interpret the Constitution. TAnK CONSr.
art. 50.2. This provides for a situation where the legislature can pass laws that are
clearly unconstitutional, yet declare them to be constitutional anyway. ABAICEELI
TAJIKISTAN ANALYSIS, supra, at 6.
182. Schwartz, supra note 159, at 173; ABAICEELI RUSSIA ANALYSIS, supra note
39, at 45.
183. Id. With no tradition of an independent judiciary, the public's confidence in
such a non-majoritarian institution is vital for the continuation of democratic reform.
Id.
184. ABAICEELI RussiA ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 41.
185. KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 80.2.
186. Id.
187. See KONST. RFR [Constitutionl art. 85.1 (allowing the President to use
"reconciliation" measures to solve these disputes and noting that the President may
refer them to the courts if unsuccessful); supra note 59 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining this provision in detail).
188. ABA/CEELI RussiA ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 41. In fact, these grants of
power appear to contradict the Court's right of constitutional interpretation and its
jurisdiction over intra-governmental disputes. See KONsT. RFR [Constitution] art. 125
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courts should serve as a bulwark against executive abuse,'89 it appears
that here too, the President's expansive powers have infringed upon their
jurisdiction.' 9
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The most important and urgent amendments to the Russian Constitu-
tion should address the extensive powers of the President. 9 ' Many of
the most serious problems with the construction of the Russian govern-
ment exist because the President wields such tremendous power over the
government's other branches."9
In order to develop a truly effective Parliament, there must be a re-
duction in the President's ability to rule by edict. 93 In a separation of
powers system, the legislature must have priority over the President in
the making of laws;'94 otherwise the separation is merely illusory. It is
unlikely that Russia will turn to the American system which grants all
legislative power to Congress, leaving it up to the legislature whether to
grant certain regulatory powers to the executive.'95 Instead, a system
similar to that used in France may work well in a country which does
not fully trust its legislature. In most cases, the French Constitution
requires that legislation be the primary form of lawmaking."9 It does,
however, grant the Council of Ministers (Government) the power to
issue decrees in limited situations and within a limited scope." This
(granting similar powers to the Constitutional Court).
189. Schwartz, supra note 159, at 167, 188.
190. ABA/CEELI RussiA ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 41.
191. See KONST. RFR [Constitution] arts. 80-93 (detailing the structure and powers
of the presidency in the Russian Federation).
192. See id. arts. 94-125 (describing the composition, powers, and limitations of
the Federal Assembly, the Government, and the Constitutional Court); supra notes 70-
85 and accompanying text (discussing in detail the problems posed by presidential
power over these branches).
193. KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 90.
194. See ABA/CEELI RussIA ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 20-22 (criticizing the
nearly unlimited decree-making power of the Russian President).
195. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vest-
ed in a Congress of the United States." Id.
196. FR. CONST. art. 34. The French Constitution declares, "All laws shall be
passed by Parliament." Id.
197. Id. art. 38. The document states: "The Government may, in order to carry
out its program, ask Parliament to authorize it [the Government], for a limited period,
to take through ordinances measures [sic] that are normally within the domain of
law." Id. The President is obligated to sign these decrees. Id.
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allows the legislature to develop independently, while permitting an
alternative method of lawmaking should the President and Parliament
become deadlocked.'98
Another serious obstacle to the development of a truly independent
and effective Parliament is the ability of the President to dismiss the
elected deputies of the State Duma.2 Although in the short-term these
provisions may prove helpful in quickly resolving impasses, if
abused, they could lead the electorate to believe that votes cast for an
opponent of the President are meaningless. At the very least, the Consti-
tution should include a one-year-after-elections moratorium on dissolu-
tion of the Duma in cases in which it refuses to confirm the President's
nomination for Chairman of the Government.' Also a provision set-
ting the maximum number of times that the President may nominate the
same person to the Government Chairman position at two would further
lessen the President's power over the Duma. If after three attempts, the
Duma still refuses to confirm a candidate in this manner, the President
could dissolve it and call for new elections. After the second rejected
candidate, however, a mandatory meeting between the President and
opposition leaders should occur in order to facilitate agreement and
avoid dissolution. The President thereby retains time to convince the
Duma to accept the candidate on a second vote, but cannot force disso-
lution by nominating a clearly unacceptable candidate for a third time.
Further, the time required to accomplish this, as well as the mandatory
meeting, will lead to more open, democratic debate.'
198. Id. arts. 34, 38. Another advantage of eliminating the President's nearly un-
limited edict power is that it will remove the incentive for executive vetoes of legis-
lation. See ABA/CEELI RusstA ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 27 (explaining that since
the President retains the power to rule by edict, every law passed by the legislature
effectively diminishes this power). Since each new law will no longer diminish presi-
dential power to issue decrees, unnecessary executive-legislative battles may be avoid-
ed. Id.
199. KONsT. RFR [Constitution] arts. 111A, 117.3.
200. See ABA/CEELI RussiA ANALYsts, supra note 39, at 25 (describing how the
President may dismiss the Duma if it does not accede to his or her wishes).
201. See KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 109.3 (including this limitation in the
provisions allowing dissolution of the Duma upon three successive votes of no confi-
dence). No reason is currently offered for providing this protection in one instance
but not the other.
202. Contra KONsT. RFR [Constitution] art. 111.4 (allowing dissolution of the
State Duma after three successive failures to confirm the President's candidate for
Chairman of the Government). Certainly such a procedure will prove time consuming,
but it will help to discourage executive abuse. Furthermore, the time and expense of
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Clarification of which branch of government guarantees the provisions
of the Constitution is also necessary. This power must belong solely to
the judiciary. Allowing the President to claim authority to protect consti-
tutional rights"0 3 not only violates separation of powers doctrine, but
may give him or her a claim, albeit tenuous, to usurp the Court's juris-
diction, and suspend judicial review in a time of crisis.
The courts' right of legislative initiative2 must also be eliminated.
A constitutional system based on the separation of powers and supported
by the concept of judicial review, is irreconcilable with the power of the
courts to propose their own legislation.2" Human beings cannot be ex-
pected to sit in judgment of themselves and remain impartial. An effec-
tive court system which commands the respect of the Russian people is
vitally important in a country with a weak legislature and few other
checks on the power of the President.'
If no other provision in the Constitution is changed, then the
statement of commitment to separation of powers should be amend-
ed. 7 Although this goal must not be abandoned, the document is
presently self-contradictory. Rather than continuing to violate Article
Ten. by following other constitutional provisions, an amendment ex-
pressing the desire to achieve the goal of true separation of powers may
be preferable. In this way, if the Russian people truly believe that these
provisions are necessary to emerge from their totalitarian past into a
viable democracy, they can do so without violating the Constitution.
This is not simply a matter of semantics. Continued violations could set
a precedent that not every article of the Constitution is, in actuality, the
supreme law of the Russian Federation.
new elections (which could conceivably result in the election of the very same depu-
ties) will not only surpass that of forced debate, but may in fact, anger an already
discouraged electorate.
203. KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 80.2.
204. Id. art. 104.1.
205. ABAICEELI RUSSIA ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 45.
206. See KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 104.1 (bestowing power upon the Consti-
tutional Court, Supreme Court, and Supreme Court of Arbitration to initiate legisla-
tion). Certainly the courts must also review the acts of the legislative branch and lo-
cal government. In the current Russian system, however, there is far more to fear
from an unchecked President.
207. KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 10.
208. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Although the concept of a constitutionally-based system of separated
powers in Russia is a new and important step toward ensuring democra-
cy in a nation with no democratic traditions, the current document will
not achieve this goal. Current-President Boris Yeltsin himself admits that
amendments will likely prove necessary in the near future.' Endowing
a single person with such a disproportionate amount of control over the
Federation not only diverges from the Constitution's stated dedication to
the separation of powers,210 it may well lead to a retreat into autocratic
rule in Russia.21 With the increasing instability of the economic and
political situation in the Russian Federation and with current-President
Boris Yeltsin's turn toward anti-democratic forces in the midst of the
Chechnya crisis, the specter of a radical nationalist take-over of the
Kremlin looms large. Although the immediate possibility of a coup
seems remote,12 presidential elections are scheduled for late 1996.
Campaign promises of law and order, such as those espoused by
Vladimir Zhirinovsky in the last election,1 3 could prove irresistible to
209. Yeltsin Holds News Conference on Vote Results, MOSCOW OSTANKINO TELE-
VISION FIRST CHANNEL NETWORK, Dec. 22, 1993, translated in F.B.I.S., SOV-93-244,
Dec. 22, 1993, at 5. It is unlikely, however, that Yeltsin had a diminution of his
powers in mind.
210. KONST. RFR [Constitution] art. 10.
211. See Constitution Watch (Russia), E. EUR. CoNT. REV., Fall 1993JWinter
1994, at 17, 18 (arguing that clashes between the President and Parliament will likely
result in Parliament's dissolution).
212. Lee Hockstader, Will There be a State of Emergency?, WASH. POsT, Jan. 8,
1995, at Al. If the unpopular conflict drags on, however, analysts believe a hard-line
coup could be the end result. Id. at A26. Encouragingly, however, current-President
Yeltsin publicly reaffirmed his commitment to ensuring that the 1995 parliamentary
and 1996 presidential elections take place on schedule. During his address to the Rus-
sian Federation on February 16, 1995, Yeltsin declared that delaying the elections
would violate the Constitution. Margaret Shapiro, Yeltsin Pledges Further Reforms, No
Election Delays, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1995 at A27, A31.
213. See EIU REPORT RussiA, supra note 140, at 10-13 (explaining generally the
results of the December 1993 elections and the success of Vladimir Zhirinovsky and
his right-wing, Liberal Democratic Party). It appears that two main groups of people
voted for Mr. Zhirinovsky. The first group was urban males between the ages of 25
and 40 who strongly supported Zhirinovsky's law and order platform from the start of
the campaign. Id. at 13. The second group consisted of older, less educated males
who made up their minds late in the campaign. Id. In both cases, the central reason
for supporting Zhirinovsky appears to have been his emphasis on strong government
and a strictly ordered society. Id.
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an electorate weary of the democratically instigated chaos. The West
should note that such an event would not only reverse the democratic
gains of the Russian people, but could return the world to a cold-war-
type political situation where nuclear weapons concerns are paramount.
The Constitution of the Russian Federation in its present form will
not promote a long-lasting, secure democratic structure. It may, however,
serve as an interim document while the Federation develops its own
sense of democracy. 1' If this is the case, then the dangerous agglom-
eration of powers within the document is not as menacing as it appears.
Unfortunately, given the events of the first year after the Constitution's
passage, it seems unlikely that this Russian Constitution will emerge as
the blueprint for a stable and democratic future for the Russian
Federation.215
214. See Constitution Watch (Russia), supra note 67, at 18 (describing the evolu-
tion of Russian law since the adoption of the new Constitution).
215. See generally, Constitution Watch (Russia), supra note 68, at 23-30 (express-
ing a belief that the new Constitution is not adequate to support a properly function-
ing separation of powers system). The extent to which the spirit of the new Constitu-
tion is currently being violated was expressed by the decree issued on December 7,
1994 by current-President Boris Yeltsin. Yeltsin signed an ukaz, declaring December
12 to be Constitution Day in the Russian Federation. Ironically, the State Duma had
rejected such a proposal the previous day. Id. at 28.
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